




























1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. A government supportive of Turkey’s accession for geopolitical reasons  
The British government has traditionally been an enthusiastic advocate of Turkish membership of the  
European Union (EU). This policy has been common to Labour and Conservative governments over 
the past twenty five years. Both Parties have stressed the geopolitical arguments in favour of Turkish 
membership of the European Union, reflecting in this the long-held American view that a 
Westernized Turkey firmly anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU 
would be a factor for stability in the Middle East and an outpost of American and European interests 
in the region. An additional, if less important consideration for British policy-makers has been the 
hope that good relations between the EU and Turkey might facilitate a consensual solution to the 
continuing problems of a divided Cyprus. 
1.2. A way of ǲdilutingǳ the Union? 
Until very recently, British governmental support for Turkish membership of the EU formed part of a 
more general commitment of the British government to the enlargement of the Union, initially to the 
former countries of the Warsaw Pact. In this context, the British government has always stressed the 
common benefits arising both to the Union and to new members from the consolidation of 
democracy and the increase in prosperity in countries on the Union borders. This analysis, initially 
controversial, has come to be widely shared within the Union and has driven the expansion of the 
Union over the past decade. Some observers however have believed that British governmental 
commitment to enlargement of the Union was also a mechanism whereby the British government 
hoped to encourage a slowing down of European integration as the Union became larger and more 
diverse. British support for Turkish membership of the Union was seen by these observers as being 
the logical conclusion of this underlying tactic for diluting the Union and retarding its political 
integration. 
1.3. Concerns about immigration during the referendum campaign 2016  
See 1.1 for the position before the British EU referendum on 23 June 2016. During and since the 
referendum, it became clear that many British citizens could be mobilized against the European 
Union by the fear of millions of Turkish workers enjoying free movement if Turkey joined the 
European Union.  
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
  
 








2. Future of EU-Turkey Relations 
2.1. Public and elite opinion at variance on Turkey 
It must be stressed that commitment to Turkish membership of the European Union or indeed to 
enlargement more generally was always in the United Kingdom a political and never a popular 
commitment. Broader British public opinion was for long indifferent to the question of expanding the 
European Union, and the question of Turkish membership in particular seemed until recently such a 
remote possibility as to merit little or no public discussion. This situation has now changed. Over the 
past five years, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has succeeded in presenting the free 
movement of workers within the European Union as being a dangerous and damaging aspect of 
British membership of the Union. Although the general economic impact of EU immigration has been 
positive in the past decade for the United Kingdom, it has in certain geographic areas and in certain 
economic sectors led to economic and social strains which have been exacerbated by cuts in 
government expenditure that might otherwise have mitigated local and sectoral dislocation. The 
issue of EU migration was a major issue in the recent referendum on British membership of the EU. 
The question of Turkish membership of the Union came to be seen during the referendum campaign 
as part of this controversy. 
2.2. No discussion of different integration models 
There is no visible debate about different models of integration in relation to Turkey.  Specialists are 
aware that German Chancellor Angela Meƌkel faǀouƌs a ͞pƌiǀileged paƌtŶeƌship͟ ǁith Tuƌkey ďut this 
is not an issue which has generated any significant discussion in the United Kingdom. 
2.3. Attitudes hardened during the EU referendum 
The British referendum on the European Union in June 2016 was crucial in crystallizing British public 
attitudes. It should have come as little surprise to the British government that its policy of 
encouraging enlargement of the European Union and specifically of encouraging Turkish 
enlargement of the Union was so controversial during the EU referendum campaign in the summer 
of 2016. A favoured argument of UKIP during the referendum period was that imminent Turkish 
membership of the Union would allow unlimited access to the British labour market to Turkish 
citizens in a way threatening economic and social stability in the United Kingdom and perhaps even 
facilitating Islamic terrorism. UKIP also found support in some sections of British public opinion for its 
claim that Chancellor Merkel had in effect imposed upon the European Union a bilateral agreement 
with Turkey that made Turkish membership of the Union more likely in return for Turkish help in 
restricting the flow of Middle Eastern refugees from Turkey to within the Union.  
In reaction to such claims, British Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, repeatedly stressed 
during the referendum campaign the long-term nature of the prospect of Turkish membership of the 
European Union, the long transition periods that would no doubt be involved in Turkish membership 
and the necessity for radical changes anyway in Turkish society before Turkey could join the EU. The 
political effect of these declarations was immediately undermined by the attention drawn in the 
  
 








British press to promises on the website of the British Embassy in Ankara that the United Kingdom 
favoured the quickest possible membership for Turkey in the European Union. Cameron was much 
ĐƌitiĐized, eǀeŶ ďy those syŵpathetiĐ to the ͞ReŵaiŶ͟ ĐaŵpaigŶ foƌ this ill-prepared apparent 
abandonment of the traditional British attitude towards Turkish membership in the Union 
The largely unexpected outcome of the British EU referendum on 23
rd
 June and the resignation of 
CaŵeƌoŶ’s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt haǀe Đƌeated a ǀaĐuuŵ iŶ all Bƌitish poliĐy toǁaƌds the EU, a ǀaĐuuŵ ǁhiĐh 
inevitably has had consequential effects for British relations with Turkey. Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip EƌdoğaŶ is unpopular in the United Kingdom, being widely regarded as an authoritarian and 
illiberal figure, but his growing hostility to the European Union may create some potential overlap of 
interest between London and Ankara after Brexit. Much will depend in this context on the specific 
terms of Brexit and the general political atmosphere surrounding it.  
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. Mixed messages and confusion from the British government 
The debate in the United Kingdom on European issues, of which Turkey is a subset, is currently so 
entirely insular and self-absorbed that such issues as the crisis in Ukraine can play no coherent role in 
the discussion. An example of this intellectual confusion is that, to the surprise of many observers, 
the Ŷeǁ Bƌitish FoƌeigŶ “eĐƌetaƌy Boƌis JohŶsoŶ ƌeiteƌated the UK’s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to Tuƌkish 
membership of the European Union on a visit to Ankara in September 2016. Sceptical commentators 
doubted the real influence that a country about to leave the European Union could have on this 
decision, and recalled that Johnson himself had been a prominent advocate of leaving the Union 
during the referendum campaign. There seemed to many of these commentators a peculiar irony in 
JohŶsoŶ’s adǀoĐatiŶg ƌapid ŵeŵďeƌship of a UŶioŶ fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh he had ƌeĐeŶtly doŶe so ŵuĐh to 
extricate his own country.  Johnson had moreover in the earlier part of 2016 attracted much public 
attention by his vigorous criticism of Eƌdoğan and the illiberal nature of his government.  
The many ironies implicit in this visit and these comments of Foreign Secretary Johnson vividly 
illustƌate the ŵultiple uŶĐeƌtaiŶties suƌƌouŶdiŶg the UŶited KiŶgdoŵ’s ďƌoadeƌ positioŶ iŶ the ǁoƌld.  
3.2. Focus on NATO  
It can confidently be predicted that the United Kingdom will seek outside the European Union, as an 
element of its global self-projection, to maintain and perhaps even increase its commitment to 
NATO. In this context, the UK can be expected to stress in international fora the geopolitical 
importance of Turkey as a NATO member more committed to Western values than most of its 
unstable and increasingly Islamist neighbours in the Middle East. The likelihood must be that the 
British desire to reinforce NATO will in short term at least outweigh any doubts about the illiberal 
internal nature of ErdoğaŶ’s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt. JohŶsoŶ’s atteŵpt to ďuild diploŵatiĐ ďƌidges to Eƌdoğan 
in September can be seen as a reflection of this underlying analysis.  
  
 








3.3. Taking a lead from America 
 
More generally, it can also be predicted that outside the European Union the United Kingdom will 
seek to reinforce its ties with the United States of America (USA), in a way that may have implications 
for its relationship with Turkey. If the Trump administration regards Turkey as a favoured partner 
within the Middle East, then that will predispose the British government to use whatever residual 
influence it may have with its European neighbours to advocate closer relations between Turkey and 
the European Union.  It cannot be overemphasized however that every element of British foreign 
policy is in chaotic flux and this will inevitably have implications for its relations with such an 
important and difficult partner as Turkey. 
Links & Further Readings: 
 European Commission (2010): Eurobarometer, Public Opinion 1996-2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/14
/groupKy/71 
 House of Commons (2016): Early day motion 653: Political and Human Rights situation in 
Turkey, Date tabled: 07.11.2016, https://www.parliament.uk/edm/2016-17/653 
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2012), Inquiry 2011-2012: UK-Turkey 
Relations and Turkey's Regional Role  (published 4 April 2012), 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-
affairs-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2010/uk-turkey-relations/ 
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2012): UK–Turkey relations and Turkey's 
regional role Twelfth Report of Session 2010–12, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1567/1567.pdf 
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2016): IŶƋuiƌy oŶ UK’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith Tuƌkey 
Launched 21 July 2016, ongoing Evidence here: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-
affairs-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2015/uk-turkey-16-17/publications/ 
 Tuƌkish Eŵďassy LoŶdoŶ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ: Tuƌkey’s Vieǁs oŶ the House of CoŵŵoŶs FoƌeigŶ Affaiƌs 
Coŵŵittee’s Repoƌt oŶ ͞UK-Tuƌkey RelatioŶs aŶd Tuƌkey’s RegioŶal Role͟, 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/Turkish-
embassy-on-report.pdf 
 UK Government (2017): Announcements on Turkey including location-specific news, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements?include_world_location_news=1&world_
locations%5B%5D=turkey 
 Lake, Michael (2005): The EU & Turkey. The Federal Trust 
 Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (2012): Government Response to the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report of Session 2010-12: UK-Turkey 
RelatioŶs aŶd Tuƌkey’s RegioŶal Role RespoŶse Of The “eĐƌetaƌy Of “tate Foƌ FoƌeigŶ AŶd 
  
 










 UK Government (2017): Foreign Office Minister, Sir Alan Duncan, visits Turkey and Greece, 
Press Release, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-sir-alan-
duncan-visits-turkey-and-greece 
 Smith, Matthew (2016): Turkey less popular choice to join the EU than even Russia, 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/08/03/turkey-less-popular-choice-join-eu-even-russia/ 
   
 
This project has received fuŶdiŶg froŵ the EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ’s HorizoŶ 2020 research and         
innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. 
 
ABOUT FEUTURE 
FEUTURE sets out to explore fully different options for further EU-Turkey 
cooperation in the next decade, including analysis of the challenges and 
opportunities connected with further integration of Turkey with the EU.  
To do so, FEUTURE applies a comprehensive research approach with the 
following three main objectives: 
1. Mapping the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relationship in terms of their 
underlying historical narratives and thematic key drivers.  
2. Testing and substantiating the most likely scenario(s) for the future and 
assessing the implications (challenges and opportunities) these may have 
on the EU and Turkey, as well as the neighbourhood and the global scene. 
3. Drawing policy recommendations for the EU and Turkey on the basis of a 
strong evidence-based foundation in the future trajectory of EU-Turkey 
relations.   
FEUTURE is coordinated by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Director of the Centre for 
Turkey and European Union Studies at the University of Cologne and Dr. Nathalie 
Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.  
The FEUTURE consortium consists of 15 renowned universities and think tanks 
from the EU, Turkey and the neighbourhood. 
Coordination Office at University of Cologne: 
Project Director:                             Dr. Funda Tekin 
Project and Financial Manager:   since November 2018 Darius Ribbe (previously  
                                                           Hanna-Lisa Hauge 









Disclaimer: This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission 
cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained 
therein. 
